Public Bill Committee

[Mr. Jim Hood in the Chair]

Clause 40

Disqualification for holding etc. driving licence or travel authorisation

Mark Harper: I beg to move amendment 33, in clause 40, page 43, line 39, leave out subsection (7).
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr. Hood, on this last day of the Committees proceedings.
This is a probing amendment; its primary purpose is to probe Ministers on the means by which disqualification orders will be served, to ensure that they are received by those persons that they are aimed at. One organisation that campaigns in that area, Families Need Fathers, has told us that quite a lot of communication from the Child Support Agency, and more recently from the Child Maintenance and Enforcement Commission, tends to go missing. It also said that, to be honest, people tend to be blasÃ(c) about letters from the Child Support Agency.
I should like to probe Ministers on the method by which the disqualification orders will be served, the nature of them, and the procedure to ensure that individuals have actually received notice of the intention to disqualify them from their driving licence or travel authorisation. How would we avoid, for example, the notice turning up in the post, someone being away for a week and discovering on their return that their driving licence has been taken away? I should like some detail about how that will workwill it be delivered by post, recorded delivery, or a visit? Will there have to be some evidence that the document has been received? This is a probing amendment to cover such issues and to ensure that, given the seriousness of this penalty and the fact that it can be imposed by an administrative order, the proper procedures are in place to ensure that the right people receive the notice and that they have been made aware of it before those steps are taken.
For the benefit of the Committee, as general background to the clause, I think the Secretary of State was quite right to point out at Second Reading that this procedure represents a change from the Child Maintenance and Other Payments Act 2008. One of the things that is important, and one of the reasons that we decided to support this, was that in a subsequent clause there is effectively a sunset clausethis will have to be looked at to determine how effective it would be. I know from discussions that my hon. Friend the Member for South-West Bedfordshire (Andrew Selous), who speaks for us on child maintenance issues, has had evidence, albeit anecdotal, from the United States of America that the threat of those disqualification orders for both driving licences and travel authorisation is apparently a very effective way of changing the behaviour of non-resident parents. Given that effectiveness, it is at least worth trying this approach.
The Bill makes it clear that, after the two-year review period, Ministers have to look at the evidence and lay that report before Parliament and take a decision either to allow this to continue or to stop it. Given that the provisions are time-limited to 30 months and that there is then an opportunity for Parliament to assess whether they have worked, it is worth trying them. If we are going to do it, it is imperative that the Government make sure that it works properlynothing would discredit this more quickly than a small number of non-resident parents receiving disqualification orders and there being a problem in their delivery, creating a number of injustices. That would be the quickest way to bring this procedure into disrepute, which would ultimately harm the children and the families that it is meant to help. It would be helpful to the Committee if the Minister could clear that up.

Kitty Ussher: It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr. Hood.
I am grateful for the amendment as it gives me an opportunity to provide a little more detail about how a disqualification order would work in practice. I was relieved to hear that this is a probing amendment. I would have been slightly worried by the possibility that this subsection could be deleted because that would have meant that we could take away peoples passports or driving licences without notifying them that that was our intention. I am therefore grateful for the opportunity to explain how it would work.
The legislation is crystal clear: the order cannot take effect until the person receives notice of the order. The legislation does not specify exactly how this should happen, but I am happy to confirm that, in practice, this will be by registered post or by hand delivery. There is a right of appeal, and the legislation makes it clear that, where there are reasonable grounds to do so, the appeal rights can be extended in time and even renewed. We think that is sufficient .
The hon. Gentleman mentioned the possibility that communications from the Child Support Agency might be routinely ignored by precisely the people whose attention we are trying to attract. I am afraid that argument does not wash too well with me. He is right to say that international evidence on the effectiveness of both these measures is quite clear. I was particularly taken by the Australian example, which shows that, strangely enough, when the holiday season comes around there is an increase in the maintenance paid by people who wish to use their passport. That is exactly the kind of thing we will be looking at.
The hon. Gentleman has also rightly said that there is a two-year trial period for driving licences. The international evidenceparticularly from various states in Americashowed that the threat of being disqualified from driving does seem to have precisely the type of behavioural effect we would want on people who have been routinely ignoring Child Support Agency communications. Since disqualifying someone from driving has more complicated effects than removing a travel document, we felt it was right to have a trial period. We will be looking at all the evidence, including the effects on the courts and the criminal justice system. I hope that is sufficient detail to enable the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.

Mark Harper: I am grateful to the Minister, and pleased that she is able to confirm that there will be a process in place to use either registered post, which requires a signature for delivery, or a personal visit, to ensure that the correct individual has actually received the notice. I think that is right. First, it will help to ensure that there are as few cases of injustice as possible. Secondly, the last thing we want to do is clog up the magistrates courts with lots of appeals that are only there because of administrative foul-ups.
Having got those assurances on the record, and having heard the Minister elaborate on some of the evidenceand confirming, as the Bill says, that this will be assessed over the trial period and looked at very carefullyI beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Mark Harper: I beg to move amendment 34, in clause 40, page 44, line 10, leave out paragraph (b).
If there any Members here who were on the Committee of the Child Maintenance and Other Payments Bill

Paul Rowen: Yes.

Mark Harper: The hon. Gentleman says he wasthose Members will find this amendment rather familiar. The amendment looks at the definition of travel authorisation: there are two definitions in clause 40. The first is a United Kingdom passport and the second is an ID card. The reason for mentioning this is that, under the Governments proposals, an ID card is not just a travel authorisation document. The Government plan eventually to use the ID card as a method of accessing a whole range of public services.
The purpose of the amendment is to probe what exactly the Government mean by removing somebodys ID card. Are they proposing to remove just the travel feature of the cardI am not entirely certain how that would workor are they proposing to take the ID card away altogether? Given what the Government have said about their future plansthat ID cards will be the way that people access public serviceswe would not just be taking away travel authorisation; we would potentially be taking away the means of accessing a whole range of public services, including health care and education.
We will not comment in this Committee on whether the Governments plans for ID cards are wise: that would try your patience, Mr. Hood. However,they must be very clear about how they intend to implement the travel authorisation provisions. Is there a way of having a particular feature of the ID card enabled or disabled, or does the whole ID card have to be taken away? It would be of great assistance to the Committee if the Minister could explain that in more detail.

Kitty Ussher: I am extremely happy to do that. It may reassure the hon. Gentleman to know that the approach we are taking here is exactly the same as that in the Identity Cards Act 2006. That amended legislation concerning football banning and travel restriction orders where an individual is required to surrender his or her passport. In due course, he or she will also have to surrender their ID card. Our approach is consistent with that legislation and is not ever to deny the non-resident parent access to any public services that could potentially be accessed through the use of an ID card in future.
Section 13 of the 2006 Act ensures that ID cards will not be required as a condition of accessing free public services or the payment of benefit until enrolment on the national identity register is made compulsory by any future Act of Parliament. It is not an issue under current legislation, therefore, but if and when that happens, and where the commission makes an administrative order of this sort, the Identity and Passport Service will replace the non-resident parents normal ID card with a version that does not record that he or she is a British citizen. Therefore, the document will cease to be a travel document, but will continue to be valid for use in any other way in which a future Act of Parliament might enable it. The non-resident parent would be able to use the replacement ID card to access public services or any benefit entitlement, but that card will not be suitable for travel within the EU.

Mark Harper: If the replacement ID card does not indicate that the holder is a British citizen, how can it be used as a method of determining whether they are entitled to a range of other public services or benefits, some of which may require that they be a British citizen in order to qualify for them?

Kitty Ussher: It is in order to mirror the provisions were it to be a passport that is effectively annulled under the current legal situation. It is removing that part of the ID card that is equivalent to a passport and a travel document, while retaining all the other entitlements that could, hypothetically, be accessible after a future Act of Parliament. It is residence, not citizenship, that denotes entitlement to public services, so I can reassure the hon. Gentleman that people will not be disentitled to those. They will, however, be prevented from travel. That works in the same way as the legislation applies to football hooligans.

Mark Harper: I am grateful to the Minister for her explanation. It is rather better than the one we heard when we probed this on the Child Maintenance and Other Payments Billmaybe that issue had not been worked out then. [Interruption.] That was not a dig at the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington. He did a generally excellent job of championing that Bill through the House of Commons and turning it into an Act of Parliament. It was just on that particular question that he did not provide anything approaching such an elegant explanation as the hon. Lady has.
Given the hon. Ladys explanation and as she has confirmed that taking away the travel authorisation part of the ID card is all that is proposed, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Mark Harper: I beg to move amendment 35, in clause 40, page 47, line 1, leave out subsection (3).
Unless the Minister will provide a good explanation to the contrary, subsection (3) seems to be particularly unjust. It means that if someone receives a disqualification order to have either their driving licence or their travel document removed, and subsequently appeals to the court, and the court agrees that there has been a problem and revokes that disqualification, the commission would still be able to receive its appeal costs from that individual. We are talking about a case where someone has received their disqualification, gone to court, and shown that it was not proper or right for them to be disqualified from having either their driving licence or travel authorisation. However, they will still be held liable for the commissions costs in the appeal process.
It seems to me that this is not just. If the commission seeks a disqualification order and is successful, it is not unreasonable that it can recover its costs. However, if the person appeals and is successful, the commission should have to bear that cost. Clearly, if the person appeals and is unsuccessful, which demonstrates that the commission took the right steps, it does not seem unreasonable that they should bear the cost. However, if they are successful it is not at all just that they are expected to bear the cost of the commissions behaviour.
It could be that the commission was completely unjustified in seeking to disqualify the person from having a driving licence or travel authorisation and had no grounds to do so, and the person appealed to the court to put that right; I do not see why the person should be expected to pay the costs. Given that this whole piece of legislation is about getting more money from non-resident parents to their families, in a case where it is not shown that they have behaved in a way that warrants removing their driving licence or travel authorisation, taking money from them seems perverse. Will the Minister explain why this apparently unjust measure is contained within this otherwise perfectly acceptable clause?

Kitty Ussher: I am happy to explain why this subsection is there, and I do not think it is unjust. The key to it is this: it is something that the courts may do. They may award costs to the non-resident parent on appeal. It is not something they necessarily have to do.
The hon. Gentleman is quite right. If the non-resident parent has followed all the rules and it transpires on appeal that they should not be disqualified from using their passport or driving licence for one of the reasons that is set out clearly in legislationfor example, their childrens welfare would be affected, they need it for their livelihood or they have not wilfully refused or culpably neglected to pay maintenancethen it is at the discretion of the court not to award costs to them.
Let me turn this around. You can construct an argument where even if one of those criteria is metthe non-resident parent could be one of the people that the hon. Gentleman characterised in a previous amendment, who perhaps is routinely ignoring any correspondence or attempt to communicate and find out the facts from the Child Support Agency. The parent may well need their driving licence in order to earn a living, but has never bothered to communicate that despite numerous attempts to ascertain the situation. It is only when presented with the last possibility to ensure this does not happen that they actually engage. At this point, I think it would be wrong that the taxpayer should pay the costs. In such cases, it should be at the courts discretionit should have the option of imposing costs. The fact that a non-resident parent may have to pay costswhich is obviously something that would be communicated to them at an earlier stagewould also help prevent manipulation of the appeals process. It would raise the stakes slightly, so perhaps fewer cases would come unnecessarily to court. That would also be a good use of taxpayers resources.
It is not always the case that the non-resident parent would have to pay costs, but I can envisage circumstances where a court acting with the discretionary powers we are giving it may consider it fair to award costs to the non-resident parent. That is why the subsection is in the legislation.

Mark Harper: That was not a terribly good explanation. It sounded remarkably as though the Minister is talking about using the appeal costs as some sort of punishment. If she wants to have a form of punishment in the legislation, it should be explicit; the costs of the appeal should not be used as a back-door method of punishment. I am concerned about non-resident parents who have done nothing wrong but end up having a disqualification order sought against them, who successfully appeal against the order because the commission has taken the incorrect steps, and then find that they have an award of costs against them.
In addition, there is nothing in the Bill to suggest that the commissions appeal costs are in any way reasonable. Will the Minister go away and consider whether the commissions appeal costs ought to be reasonable, and come back to us, perhaps on Report? We do not want the commission, using taxpayers money, to spend a lot of money on these processes, at the end of which non-resident parents who have done nothing wrong and have successfully won their appeal are hit with a significant bill. That is the danger with this type of legislation: if we are not to create a lot of martyrs, it is sensible to ensure that these powers are used proportionately.
The Minister is correct that the subsection just gives the court the ability to award costsobviously we are depending on the courts looking at all the facts of the case and being reasonable. Given that that safeguard is in there, and given the Ministers explanation about where she thinks this power is likely to be used, I am quite happy to seek leave of the Committee to withdraw my amendment. But I would like to ask her to go away and have a look to see whether any check is neededwhether in the legislation or the regulationson what the commission is allowed to spend on appeals, to make sure that it is reasonable.

Kitty Ussher: So that we can satisfy ourselves that unreasonable costs will not be put on non-resident parents appealing, even when there is no fault on the commissions side, I would be happy to have a look at the issue and perhaps write to the hon. Gentleman.

Mark Harper: That is very generous of the Minister. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Paul Rowen: Before we go on to agree on the clause, there are a couple of comments that I would like to make and a few questions I would like to ask the Minister, to which I hope she can respond.
First, it is clear from the Child Maintenance and Other Payments Bill that the Department already has the ability to disqualify and take away licences and passports. In the House of Lords on 13 May 2008 the Lord McKenzie of Luton made the following statement:
I therefore acknowledge your Lordships concerns relating to that provision and accept that the prevailing view at present is that the decision should be made by the courts.[Official Report, House of Lords, 13 May 2008; Vol. 701, c. 963.]
I would like to ask the Minister what new evidence has come to light that, since that statement, it has proved necessary to remove the reference to the courts. Give that the Child Maintenance and Enforcement Commission has only been operational since October last year, perhaps she would tell us how many applications have been made to the court and whether there is evidence that that process has proved slow and unsuccessful.
The second question that I would like to ask the Minister concerns the implementation of the orders. Who will actually be implementing the order and at what level in the structure? There is concern that very junior civil servants might issue these orders. What internal checks will exist to ensure that it is the last resort and that proper checks have been made before an order is issued?
In addition, there is a wider concernI admit that it applies more to CMECs predecessorsabout the number of orders that the Child Support Agency already gets wrong. One of the issues in the clause is that, although the court can discuss whether disqualification is appropriate, it is not allowed to discuss whether the sum that is being talked about is correct. A concern about the CSArather than CMEC, because the CSA has been in operation longeris the fact that it often gets it wrong. I am sure members of the Committee have examples from their own constituency casework of the CSA getting a maintenance order figure wrong and, following a challenge, having to revise it.
My final question was also raised by Fathers for Justice. When a driving licence has been withdrawn, what action will the Department take if that parent loses his job or is unable to do his job? There have been examples of the withdrawal of licences having disastrous effects, not only in respect of peoples livelihood but in respect of their ability to see their children.
I shall be grateful if the Minister will answer those points.

Kitty Ussher: I am grateful for the opportunity to answer the points raised by the hon. Gentleman. On his final point, I am interested that he quotes evidence from Fathers for Justice; I do not see it particularly as a credible organisation, but obviously the hon. Gentleman does. I do not know whether he or Fathers for Justice have read the legislation, because the Bill makes it quite clear that, if the document concerned is required for the non-resident parent to earn his livelihood, it should never be removed; and if its removal would have an effect on the welfare of a child, whether it is the child in question or other children of whom he is the parent or with whom he is associated, then it will not be removed.
Moreover, the onus of proof will be on the commission to demonstrate that the parent is wilfully and culpably refusing to pay child maintenance. That is quite a high level of proof, and is one of the safeguards in the legislation showing that this provision will not be used willy-nilly by junior clerks in the organisation. There will be quite rigorous internal mechanisms, and the outstanding debt would have already been checked when the liability order was madewhich must be done before tougher forms of enforcement can be considered.
The commission will obviously complete any outstanding maintenance assessment action on each individual case where it is relevant to the level of arrears. The caseworkers will be trained in the new legislation to guide them in the decision-making process. The non-resident parent will have been given notice of the fact that a liability order is being considered, and they will have the opportunity at that stage to make representations. So if an error has been made, or if they fall into one of the categories on the face of the Bill, they will have an opportunity to pick that up at an early stage. I am therefore certain that this is not something that will be used lightly or inappropriately, and I wish Fathers for Justice had the same view.
The hon. Gentlemans first point related to the history of last years child maintenance legislation. We did say that we would continue to consider which decisions needed to be made by the courts, and which needed to be made administratively. In the intervening period of time, more international evidence has come to light that makes it clear that it is an extremely effective policy. Between July 2006 and August 2008, for examplethis is extra data that we did not have during the passage of the previous legislationan additional 11 million Australian dollars was collected in child maintenance payments brought about by the use of around 1,800 prohibition orders relating to Australian travel documents. A review of a sample of 124 cases where such an order had been made indicated that 88 per cent. of customers had continued to pay the right amount of child support 12 months after the order had been lifted, whereas they had previously simply disengaged with the process.
We think that makes the case for legislating even clearer than before. But I also have to sayI am repeating the point made by my right hon. Friend the Secretary of Statethat, in a sense, we had no option but to withdraw our proposals on administrative disqualification of a travel document, because the main Opposition party had made it quite clear that it would not support the rest of the Bill unless that was removed. There was a touch of realpolitik in it that was extremely regrettable. I am very glad that the main Opposition party now appears to have done an elegant U-turn, hopefully enabling this clause to go through. I hope that that is sufficient to allow the Committee to agree to clause 40.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 40 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 5 agreed to.

Clauses 41 and 42 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 43

Child support maintenance: offences relating to information

Mark Harper: I beg to move amendment 83, in clause 43, page 49, leave out line 8.
The clause requires a person liable to make payments of child support maintenance to notify a change of address, or any other change of circumstances. The amendment leaves out the line that says
any other change of circumstances.
This is a probing amendment to ask the Minister to give the Committee more detail about the type of information that the Government envisage being used.
On the face of it, the clause is drafted incredibly widely: someone would be guilty of an offence for not notifying any other change of circumstances with no information as to what that might mean. Ministers clearly envisage some of that detail being contained in regulations, but I should like to set out for the Committee some of the areas of concern in order to inform the nature of the regulations and how tightly they are drafted.
Some of the information and some of the concerns have been raised by Families Need Fathers, which is keen to campaign in this area. It has spelt out the concerns about the lack of due specificity on the face of the Bill. It has also raised concerns, which I know the Government share as they set out in their document how they thought the regulations might be used, that, should those regulations not be defined tightly enough, it will generate a significant number of flows of information into the Child Maintenance Enforcement Commission. That would have the opposite effect to what the commission is seeking. The commission is trying to streamline its future case load by reducing the number of cases in which it carries out reviews of change of circumstances; for example, it is reducing the number of times it will look at a child maintenance award where the income varies by less than 25 per cent. It would seem that, unless this provision is narrowly drawn, it would generate the inflow of a huge amount of information to CMEC, which would offset the work it is doing to reduce its work load in order to focus more effectively on the cases that require the most attention.
I have not seen any evidenceperhaps the Minister could supply the Committee with someabout the kinds of information that should be supplied to CMEC under the clause, and how that would make the payment of child maintenance more effective and more likely to reach the family in which the child is resident, which is the purpose of the test.
I have looked at the document that the Ministers have published detailing how they plan to use regulation-making powers. They have said that the definition of other change of circumstances would be left to secondary legislation, which would allow the commission flexibility and time to consult stakeholders as part of its process for developing policy. That sounds sensible, but there is nothing in the Bill that constrains any of thatno guidance is provided.
On a positive note, to be fair to Ministers, paragraph 376 of that document does say that Ministers are
mindful of not creating unnecessary offences
and that they want regulations to be
tightly and precisely termed to ensure there is a clear understanding of any requirement placed on parents.
In fact, Ministers have acknowledged the concern that I and Families Need Fathers have outlined about the burden of information coming into the commission. They have said:
Indeed, the changes of circumstances to be notified to the Commission must be narrow enough to enable the system to process the information without becoming over burdened.
So I think Ministers recognise that the clause is widely drawn and that the regulations will need to be narrow and tightly focused so as to be fair to parents and so as not to burden the commission. It will help the Committeeas it has not seen the regulations if the Minister will give some idea of the kinds of information that the Government and the commission have in mind. The Committee can then be reassured that Ministers will be committed to the objective of having tightly defined terms when they bring the regulations before the House.

Kitty Ussher: I am delighted to be able to reassure the hon. Gentleman. We absolutely want to be able to define precisely the types of change of circumstance that people will be required to notify to the commission. If I give some history of the journey of the policy, it may help to explain why this is in the legislation.
During the passage of the 2008 Act, the Government rejected an Opposition amendment that would have made it a requirement for non-resident parents to inform us of any change to their circumstances that would affect their liability; the onus would be on them to decide whether a particular change would affect their liability. The amendment was rejected because we felt that it would create precisely the problems that the hon. Gentleman now says he wishes to avoid. Individuals might not know, or they might be so cautious that they would overburden the commission with lots of minutiae of changes that did not affect their liability.
Subsequently, we introduced an amendment to make it an offence for non-resident parents not to inform the commission of changes to their address. The reason for that is practical: it should be an offence if someone moves house and does not notify the commission, to avoid paying the liability that they owe to their children.
After some reflection, we would like now to explore with stakeholders whether there are other clearly defined circumstances under which we would like to make it an offence for people not to notify the commission of changes of circumstances. The primary power is not drafted widely so as to have a wide responsibility, as with the amendment we rejected last year. It is drafted widely to give us the opportunity tightly to define in regulations following consultation precisely what would be included in the powerI cannot be precise about what that will be because we want to consult to work that out. However, I am happy to reassure the hon. Gentleman that it will be simple to understand and designed not to overburden either the commission or the non-resident parent.
The type of avenues that we may wish to explore with anyone who has an interest are, perhaps, significant changes to employment, significant changes in earnings in either direction, a change of job, or losing ones job and leaving the work force for a while. I do not want to say definitely that those will be the avenues because we want to explore the issue.
I am aware of the concerns that Families Need Fathers has rightly raised, I understand, in a conversation last week with the chief executive of CMEC. We will continue to work with it and other groups and we will not propose regulations until we are sure that we have a simple, workable way to ensure that children are more likely to receive what they are owed. I hope that reassures the hon. Gentleman.

Mark Harper: I am grateful to the Minister. Although the amendment to which she referred was not as brilliantly drafted as this onenot having had the benefit of parliamentary counselit clearly had some merit, as Ministers have thought about it again. It was tabled on the basis of making sure that parents would have to disclose relevant information and that the burden was not put on the parent with care or CMEC, who might have to go on a hunting expedition.
I am pleased that the Minister confirmed that it is intended that regulations be tightly drawn. Clearly, as has been acknowledged, it would not be in the interests of the commission to have widely drawn regulations because it would simply be overburdened by information. She has clearly indicated that the changes likely to be consulted upon are to do with employment status, earnings and income. I am pleased that she wants to ensure that the commission engages with all the stakeholder groups to have a proper conversation about those. We will obviously scrutinise the secondary legislation when those regulations are brought before the House, but in these circumstances and with those reassurances, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 43 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 44 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 6

Registration of births

Mark Harper: I beg to move amendment 36, in schedule 6, page 91, line 42, leave out paragraph (d).

Jimmy Hood: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment 37, in schedule 6, page 91, line 46, leave out reason and insert reasonable grounds.
Amendment 105, in schedule 6, page 91, line 47, after child, insert or other children living with her.
Amendment 103, in schedule 6, page 94, line 2, at end insert
(c) where the mother acknowledges the person as the father of the child, but has reason to fear for her safety or that of the child if the father were to acquire responsibility by virtue of section 4(1)(a) of the Children Act 1989.
Amendment 104, in schedule 6, page 98, line 19, at end insert
(8) This section does not apply where the mother acknowledges the person as the father of the child, but has reason to fear for her safety or that of the child if the father were to acquire parental responsibility by virtue of section 4(1)(a) of the Children Act 1989.

Mark Harper: It is worth saying at the beginning that the amendments standing in my name and those of my colleaguesamendments 36 and 37are probing amendments. They attempt to understand the intentions that underlie this schedule.
The lead amendment leaves out paragraph (d) of proposed new section 2B of the Amendments of Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953. That paragraph is within a set of conditions where it would not be required for the mother to provide the registrar with information relating to the fathershe would be able to declare that certain conditions were in place. The particular condition I am suggesting should be left out is,
that the mother does not know the fathers whereabouts.
It seems to me that not knowing the whereabouts of the father should not affect whether the mother is required to declare that the person is the father of the child. I completely agree with paragraph (c),
that if the mother does not know the fathers identity
she clearly is not able to notify the registrar who the father is. However, not knowing his whereabouts does not seem a very good reason for not notifying the registrar who the father is. She does not have to know his whereabouts to know who he is.
I bring the matter up because with the inclusion of paragraph (d), the requirement effectively becomes completely voluntary. It places no particular burden on the mother at all and there is a very clear get-out clause. I want to understand what purpose the Government have in introducing the paragraph. There is clearly a signal about the importance of fatherhood and getting both parents registered, which is welcome and significant. The other aspectbrought up in the early stages of this Committees proceedings in an evidence-taking session by the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeleywas about the importance to the child of knowing who both their parents are, and knowing who the father is.
During the question and answer session it seemed to me that the Minister did not really grasp to the fullest extent the point that the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley was making. If it is important to the child to know who both the parents are, allowing the mother not to disclose, or not putting an obligation on disclosing who the father is just because the mother does not know his whereabouts, does not seem a terribly powerful reason. It would be helpful if the Minister set out the purpose of this part of the Bill and stated what the Government are trying to achieve. Are they looking at the childs right to know who its parents are, and/or are they looking at sending a clear message that fatherhood is important and fathers should take responsibility? In that case it is linked partly to the child maintenance provisions. If it is important for the child to know who its parents are and important to send out this message, there seem to be far too many reasons why the mother can avoid disclosing who the father is.
Amendment 37, which is in the same vein as amendment 36, refers to paragraph (f), the condition that
the mother has reason to fear for her safety or that of the child if the father is contacted in relation to the registration of the birth.
The amendment replaces reason with reasonable grounds. The motivation for probing on that is twofold. First, in an evidence-taking session the hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley made the point that if the Minister included this provision because of the importance of the childs knowing who its parents are, any danger posed by the parent is not in itself relevant to identifying who they are. Clearly, steps may need to be taken as to whether that parent has legal access to the child; but purely knowing who they are is not really relevant.
The other concern about having paragraph (f) as an exclusion clause is that, given the way human relationships sometimes work, I would not want to see a situation where a mother was able to avoid naming the father, giving as a reason an unjustified fear for her safety or that of her child, and effectively use that as an allegation against the father. Those are the grounds for removing the word reason and inserting reasonable grounds. A court would have to judge what reasonable grounds meant, which is the usual test of what a reasonable person might think in those circumstances.
The purpose of the amendment is to probe the Minister on those two concerns. If she would set out the Governments objective in bringing forward this clause and schedule, and what it is trying to achieve, we shall be able to move somewhat further forward.

Paul Rowen: The Liberal Democrats support the principle of joint registration. We know that only one parent is named in about 7 per cent. of all births registered at the moment, and we believe that we should encourage and seek as far as possible for both parents to be registered on the birth certificate.
However, we have some concerns about the phraseology of the schedule and the clause, which is very much based on there being a violent relationship and the registration of the birth being used by the father to get at the mother or the child. Amendment 105 seeks to extend the provisions in the Bill to not just the child who has been registered, but any other children who may be living with the mother, where the mother can give a reason for not registering their birth. There are instances where fathers have used the ability to get contact with a child to get at the mother. I am asking the Minister what safeguards she will put in place against that.
To remind the Minister, she said on 12 February that
if it is reasonably thought that the father is of such character that the very act of contacting him would lead to aggression towards the mother or the child, it is right that the state should not do something that would probably have such an unfortunate outcome.[Official Report, Welfare Reform Public Bill Committee, 12 February 2009; c. 85, Q154.]
I totally agree with those sentiments. With amendment 105 we are seeking to broaden the exemptions within the Bill so that the father is not enabled to get to another child. We believe that we should not just be concerned about the safety of the child whose birth is registered.

Mark Harper: Will the hon. Gentleman clear up what he thinks about the question that I brought up about his amendment, which refers to section 4(1)(a) of the Children Act 1989, and about his concerns about a father requiring parental responsibility? That section of the 1989 Act simply says that, on the application of the father, the court may order that he shall have parental responsibility for the child. Given that the court has to do that, there seem to be perfectly adequate safeguards. If the mother has legitimate concerns about the safety of the child in question, or that of her other children, or indeed her own safety, all that evidence can be put before the court, and the court can take all that into account when it is making orders about the relationship and the legal rights that the father will have over that child. That is perfectly adequate without the hon. Gentlemans amendment.

Paul Rowen: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, but his comments actually relate to amendments 103 and 104, which I was just about to come to. I am seeking assurances from the Minister about how this will operate. I am sure hon. Members will be aware that, in the week just prior to a birth and immediately after a birth, a motherparticularly one who is subject to domestic violencemight be very vulnerable. Given that the Bill proposes that registration has to take place within 42 days, we are seeking with amendments 103 and 104 to apply an exemption.
Again, it is the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, Gingerbread and Family Action that are concerned about how the clause will operate. The father could use that registration to seek parental responsibilities and use that as a threat to the mother. I appreciate that, at the end of the day, the father will have to go through the courts, or the mother will have to go through the courts to prevent that access, but the concern here is that, at this stage, if the mother has already been subject to domestic violence, she would be very vulnerable.
We support the principle of joint registration but we do not feel that, at the moment, the exemptions in the schedule go wide enough. We would like to be reassured about cases involving a vulnerable woman on her own who may have been subjected to domestic violence, and a father who exercises his right to be registered on the birth certificate and uses that as a lever to get to her and her family. That is the situation we are concerned about, and we are aiming to ensure that, without the full recourse through the courtsI am sure that the hon. Member for Forest of Dean would appreciate that going through the courts is often a difficult and traumatic business, particularly for a young mother on her own

Mark Harper: The hon. Gentleman has not read section 4(1)(a) of the 1989 Act clearly enough. It is the father who has to apply to the court to get parental responsibility for the child, not the mother. It is the father who has to kick off this process, and the mother will then be able to put relevant information before the court to inform the courts decision. But it is not the mother who has to go to the court and start the process off.

Paul Rowen: I appreciate that, but my concern is about young mums who have recently given birth being put through that process. It could be used as a lever, as a stick with which to get at those mothers, who might have been subjected to domestic violence in the past. While the hon. Gentleman or Iin a very stable mental condition, hopefullywould not have a problem with defending ourselves through the courts, it would be more difficult for someone who has been subject to domestic violence. We are seeking safeguards to ensure that the application of this joint registration will not be used as a lever to get at the mother. We would like to be reassured that this clause and schedule have been thought through. Certainly, a number of charitiesGingerbread, the NSPCC and Family Actionhave concerns about how they are worded.

Meg Munn: I do not want to discuss the issues in as much detail as we did in the evidence session, but it is important that we are clear that we are talking about two separate things. I have a great deal of sympathy with the comments of the hon. Member for Forest of Dean, but not with those of the hon. Member for Rochdale. The Government need to be fundamentally clear whether they accept that in principle, wherever practicable, a child has the right to know, through its being recorded on their birth certificate, who their birth parents are.
We are very clear in adoption legislation that at the age of 18 a child may go back and find out who their birth parents are. What is different in this situation? The practicalities of doing this are important. I agree that knowing where a person is may pose a problem, but should that be a reason not to seek to register the name of the father on a birth certificate?
I have campaigned for many years and spoken a great deal on the issues of domestic violence, but it is enormously important to separate birth registration from the mechanisms by which we protect mothers and children from violent fathers. We have processes through the court which allow people to take out injunctions. Over the last few years we have dramatically improved the processes to protect families and children. This should not prevent registration of a fathers name on a birth certificate.
Unlike the hon. Member for Rochdale, I am concerned that the exemptions are too widely drawn. Our view needs to be that, wherever possible, the fathers name should be on the birth certificate; where there is a need to protect a family, because there may be a threat of violence, that should be pursued through other legislation, not this legislation.

Kitty Ussher: We have heard some of the debate on this issuea wide range of views have been expressed in the Committee. With your permission, Mr. Hood, I should like to begin by explaining the case for change before coming to the specific points that hon. Members have raised.
The current system is far too complicated. It works very well for married couples because they can register the name of both parentsit is presumed that the married couple are the parents of the child. At present unmarried couples have two alternatives. They can both go down together, which may be logistically difficult if one of them works. It is pretty hard if they do not know that both have to go down together, which our departmental survey shows is often a problem. It is also hard if they are estranged, or if they are not in a relationship. The alternative is to get a solicitors declaration on the part of the parent who does not go down to the registry office, which is also not the easiest thing to do. It is perfectly possible that, even where the mother is completely relaxed about the fathers being on the birth certificate, the system we have created puts hurdles in the way of the father being on the birth certificate, even if he wants to be, regardless of the rights of the childwhich my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Heeley clearly stated are also important.
We want to tilt the balance towards the father and towards the child. It is worth understanding that this will not mean that 100 per cent. of children in the future will have both parents on their birth certificate, but it will mean that fathers and children will not be denied that rightin the fathers case, to be on the birth certificate; in the childs case, to have both parents on the birth certificatedue to apathy or complexity of our own making.
It is also worth clarifying that fathers can always request to be on the birth certificate, regardless of what the mother does or saysall the mother has to do is confirm that they are the father. There is now a simple system, where the father is known, for him to go on the birth certificate without having to attend: the mother states who the father is and where he is, a note is sent asking him to confirm that he is the father and then both names go on. We feel that this will lead to more children having both parents on the birth certificate and more fathers being on the birth certificate of their children. The purpose is not that fathers will then be chased by the Child Support Agency, because, to be blunt, that can happen anyway. The mother simply tells the CSA the fathers details and the procedure is kicked off. The father need not be on the birth certificate for that to happen.
The simple ceremony of birth registrationanecdotal evidence shows that this is quite important and some evidence shows that it has an effectmeans that fathers will feel more empowered about taking a positive role in their childrens lives. Although it will not be the case in every circumstance and across the board, it will help fathers to do thatnot by means of tracking them down, but simply by involving them in their childrens lives. That was one of the conclusions of a recent review that we did on the child support system.
I shall now discuss the specific amendments, in the order in which the points were made. The hon. Member for Forest of Dean is right to query that a fathers name should not be recorded if his whereabouts are not known. We are trying to avoid a situation where the mother states the name of the father and then that seems to acquire some kind of validity simply because it is recorded somewhere by the state through the registry office system. There is no reason to presume that it is true just because the mother has said it. We take the view that no data are true unless verified. In this case, they cannot be verified unless the father actually says, Yes, I am the father. I would be extremely nervous about having a system where, 30 years down the line, the child, as an adult, finds out that the mother has given a wrong name, either by accident or design, and presumes that it is true because it is written in a book in a registry office, when we have had no way of ascertaining that it is. Our approach is that no data should be recorded unless they are verifiable. They have no status unless they are verified. That is why, if the registry office has no way of checking whether the data are correct, they should not be recorded and there is therefore no need for them to be provided.
The registry office is not the CSA. The CSA uses all sorts of methods to track people down on the basis of partial information. But we are not proposing through these clauses to give extra powers to the registry office to do so. That would be entirely inappropriate. The mother can always tell the CSA the partial information. If that then leads to the father being tracked down such that he is then in a position to verify whether he is the father, the mother can always provide that information to the registrar at a later date. And, of course, it is worth bearing in mind throughout that it is illegalit is perjuryfor the mother to give false information at any stage, and that will be made clear to her when she goes to register her child. That is why we think that the whereabouts are an important part of this legislation.

Mark Harper: I am just checking that I have not misunderstood the clause. We do not all seem to be arguing about the same thing. New section 2B, about the duties of the mother to give information to the registrar, does not relate to what the registrar then has to enter into the register. The Minister is quite right that information should not be entered unless it is verified, but subsection (7) clearly states:
No information relating to the father is to be entered in the register merely because it is given by the mother.
What we are talking about here, and what my amendment goes to, is whether the mother has to provide the information to the registrar. It does not talk about what the registrar then does with it.
At the moment, the clause says that the mother has to provide certain information relating to the father to the registrar unless she makes certain declarations. One of those declarations is on the fathers whereabouts. If my amendment was accepted and that piece was taken out, it would not mean that the registrar was in any way compelled to enter the information. The mother would still have to tell the registrar who the father was. Clearly, if no one knew where he was and the registrar was unable to contact him, the father would not verify the information and would not be entered as the father on the birth certificate. But the mother would still be compelled to put that information forward. That is all that my amendment does; the argument that the Minister has outlined does not really show why the Committee should reject my amendment.

Kitty Ussher: I see absolutely no point in providing unverifiable information. Either it is recorded somewhere[Interruption.] Yes, I agree it will not be on the birth certificate, in which case that gives it a type of validity that is completely uncheckableor it is not written down, or it is written down and put in a file. That seems to be creating administration without any possible result at the end. There is no point in providing unverifiable information. At best that could lead to unnecessary paperwork, at worst it could lead to a future situation where that record is discovered and could provide misleading information about an individuals parentage. That is why I reject the amendmentit seems completely superfluous.
Mr. Harperrose

Kitty Ussher: I will allow the hon. Gentleman one more attempt at this question.

Mark Harper: I am extremely grateful to the Minister and for the tolerance of the Committee. The issue goes back to the purpose of what we are trying to get at. It was said that it is important for the mother to declare to the registrar who the father is because it is important for the child to know who its parent is. If there are lots of reasons why the mother does not have to do even that, then the chances of the registrar being able to verify that informationand verify it by the fatherbecome increasingly slim.
I do not understand why not knowing the fathers whereabouts is a good reason for the mother not to have to disclose the information. Clearly, not knowing the fathers identity is a good reason because the mother has no clue who he isthat might say something about her behaviour but it is not very useful to the registrar. If she does not know the fathers whereabouts, she should still have to declare who he is. The registrar then has the opportunity to verify that information. It seems that we are second-guessing whether that information is verifiable and making it likely that there is another child who does not know who one of his birth parents is. The Ministers argument does not make sense.

Kitty Ussher: I am very sorry that the hon. Gentleman thinks my argument does not make sense; it makes perfect sense to me that information is of no value in this context unless it is verifiable. If it is not, then we should not be collecting it. It is simply bureaucracy gone mad. If the hon. Gentleman wants to press that amendment to a Division I will be delighted to explain to the registry service why lots of bits of paper will have to be filled in for absolutely no purpose. That situation would go against what some of his colleagues say about cutting red tape; it certainly goes against what we think about that and about spending taxpayers money unnecessarily.
It is not the purpose of the registry function to become a private detective agency, to use partial information to go out and proactively find people. That is the role of the CSA; different legislation applies. The registry registers things and information is not valid if it cannot be verified. That applies to both sidesif the father rings the registry and says, I am the father of this child, the mother has to verify that that is the case.

Meg Munn: If a mother says, John Brown is the father of my child and he lives at this place, the registrar writes off to try to verify that. There is a process in which the information is held and something is happening to it. If the mother says, John Brown is the father but I do not know where he lives at the moment, that information would be held somewhere. The registry would be getting information which it could not immediately put on to a document. I am with the hon. Gentleman here; I do not see why a mother not knowing the fathers whereabouts is a good reason for not providing the information.

Kitty Ussher: I return to the point that I have made several times; I am sorry if I am not making myself clear. In this context information is not information unless it can be verified by both parentsI see no point in collecting it if it cannot be. If further details of the parents whereabouts come to light later, the process can begin again and the child can have both parents on the birth certificate.
However, the two situations are entirely different. If the mother says, Yes, it is John Brown and he lives at this address, then that information is collected in order to be able to write the letter to confirm the father, and it is entered in the register. If she says: The father is John Brown and I think he might live in Edinburgh, or, I do not know where he lives, then there is absolutely nothing that the registry office can doso there is no point in collecting that information. Perhaps we can agree to disagree on the matter, but it seems entirely clear to me. Should the information become available later, of course, or if John Brown gets in contact and says, This child is mine, then that will be checked with the mother. Obviously these are hypothetical situations. John Brown is doing well here.
Amendment 37 seeks to probe why we use the words
the mother has reason to fear for her safety.
The hon. Member for Forest of Dean was proposing changing reason to reasonable grounds. This perhaps, comes back to what the role of the registrar is. It is not the role of the registrar to perform some kind of quasi-judicial function in determining whether the mother is behaving reasonably. There is obviously a legal understanding of reasonableness. It simply gives the opportunity for the mother to make a declaration that she has reason to fear for her or her childs safety if the father is contacted, and that is sufficient.
Were we to accept the amendment, it would the discretion of the registrar would come into play. We do not want that to happen. It is for the courts to decide the concept of reasonableness, not for the clerks who work in the registry office. We are giving the mother the ability to state that she has reason to fear. If that is not true she is committing perjury, which is obviously illegal and that will be made clear to her. We think it is something that will be taken seriously.
Perhaps this is the appropriate moment to discuss the extremely welcome contribution from my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Heeley. She asked whether the child has the right to find out who both their parents are. I think they do, but the state should not create a situation that leads to violence against that child. Perhaps where we disagree is about its being an absolute right. I think the right can be overwritten in some very specified circumstances.
I want to make it absolutely clear that it is extremely important to peoplefor their own identity and understanding of their sense of selfto know who their parents are. We should do everything we can to make that as easy as possible. As I think I said at the evidence session, what concerns me is a situationthis cuts to a point raised by the hon. Member for Rochdalewhere the very act of contacting could lead to violence. It is not that the father is generally a violent person, but the act of contacting almost makes the state complicit in increasing the risk of violence against the mother, the child or other children. Where we know that is likely, or where the mother genuinely fears it, I do not think we should be doing that. It is quite simple but there may be a difference between us on that point. In those circumstances, if the father wants to put his name on and go through the appropriate procedure to do so, the mother cannot prevent it. The key question is whether the act of verifying will lead to greater violence.
I can give a hypothetical example of a scenario of the type we are trying to avoid. A woman becomes pregnant and the man says, I do not want you to have the child. It is a violent relationship. It gets to a situation where he saysand one would believe he means itIf you have the child I will do x and y to you, I will come and get you and I will come and get them. It is a nasty relationship and a horrible situation. She lies and says, This relationship is over. I am never going to see you again, I will not have this child; goodbye. She then exercises her right to choose and decides she does want to have the child. Perhaps she goes to stay with family to do that. She has the child and then she has reason to fear that if the father finds out, there will be violent reprisals against her. If the state does not take it upon itself to contact the non-resident parent there could be no more violence at all from this unhappy incident. I do not think the state should put that mother, that child and any other family members at risk of violence by the act of contacting. That is where the difference is.
If the person was violent anyway and it was not in the childs interest for them to have parental responsibilityregardless of anything else that was going onthe courts would be able to deny parental responsibility. That would apply regardless of what was on the birth certificate.
The process can be enacted extremely quickly. There is an expedited legal procedure, which means that it can happenin some caseswithin 24 hours. There was slight confusion on the part of the hon. Member for Forest of Dean. If a father is on the birth certificate, he will have parental responsibility unless the courts deny it, and that applies whether or not they are estranged.

Paul Rowen: That was very much the point I was seeking to make. At the moment, the mother can deny the father the right to register his name on the birth certificate. This procedure alters that and, by so doing, the father automatically acquires parental responsibility. Previously, the father would have had to go to the courts proactively, but now he will acquire those rights and it will be for the mother to go to the courts.
I am thinking of a scenario involving a father in an estranged couple exercising his responsibilities. There might well be disputes about registration of the family name or religion. According to figures that I have been given by Refuge, more than 30 per cent. of all violence starts or gets worse during pregnancy. Whereas, at the moment, the onus is on the father to go to the courts, with the change under schedule 6, it will be on the mother. I am asking the Minister to have another look at the workings of the measure. Without further safeguards, we will find that vulnerable women will be forced either to accept what the father is doinga lot of women will be in that positionor to go through the courts to obtain some protection.
Sometimes there will have been a clean break and the mother will have moved away. She may be trying not to have any contact with the father, but if he exercises that right, he can use it as a lever to get at her. There are real concerns there, and if the Minister agrees to look at how the process might operate, I am sure that a lot of people will be reassured. Perhaps we can make some changes at a later stage to give these women the protection that they deserve.

Kitty Ussher: That is a useful point. It might be worth bearing in mind that, if the two people are married, even if they are separated, the father automatically acquires parental responsibility, so the mother would have to go through the courts to protect herself. We are saying that if a man proactively says, I am the father, he would be in the same position as if the couple were married.
I am not going to look at this again because I think we have the balance right and that existing legal protections through the courts are sufficient to address the problems. Prove me wrong, but I think that putting the man on the register is not the act that is going to make him a dangerous person. In a sense, the dangers are already known and the procedures for protecting a family are already known and can be commenced at an early stage. If an unmarried father is unfit to exercise parental responsibility, it is for the courts to restrict or remove that responsibility. The difference is whether the state is proactively doing something that means that violence is more likely, which is where we should be drawing the line.

Meg Munn: The Minister has effectively just outlined the point I have been making. The issues of violence are there anyway, so the processes for dealing with violent people should be the ones that operate, rather than allowing holes in the rights of children to have their parents registered.

Kitty Ussher: The difference is whether the act of the state proactively creates a violent situation, or whether the violence is already there because there is knowledge of the birth. We are trying to create an exemption for a situation in which the father does not know about the birth, but the act of telling him about it would create violence. That is different from a violent parent seeking to get parental responsibility and trying to use the birth certificate as one way to achieve that, when it is right for the courts to restrict such a thing. We have probably debated this sufficiently, but I should be happy to take further interventions if another Member would like to keep going.
Through amendment 105, the hon. Member for Rochdale wants to expand the family unit that the mother may fear could be harmed beyond the mother and child to any other children. We reject the amendment because, practically, it is difficult to envisage a situation in which other children would be at threat, but the child in question and/or the mother would not. We feel that the exemptions as drafted are sufficient to take all these situations into consideration.

Paul Rowen: I would like to outline to the Minister a couple of scenarios relevant to amendment 105 that have been given to me by Gingerbread. The first is where a woman moves to a different area, unknown to the man, following allegations of sexual abuse by him against a teenage daughter. I know that there are a very small number of such cases, but there is a fear that the man could use the process of registration to find out where the family had moved to. The second scenario is

Jimmy Hood: Order. Interventions should be short, not second speeches under the guise of an intervention.

Kitty Ussher: Gingerbread obviously has a list of examples, so why do I not commit to having a conversation with the organisation after the conclusion of the Committee?

Mark Harper: I would like to return to the subject we are arguing aboutthis is where the Minister fundamentally misunderstands my proposal. The provision is about the duty of the mother to notify the registry office. She is still perfectly able to notify the registrar of unverifiable informationshe is allowed to tell the registrar who the father is, even is she has no clue where he is on planet Earth. We are simply talking about whether she has a duty to tell the registrar. She would be perfectly able to give the registrar lots of information that the registrar could not verify, but might be able to verify in the future. This is simply about whether she has the duty to tell the registrar. It goes down to how important we think it is that children know who their birth parents are.
Birth registrations should be about registering births. The hon. Member for Sheffield, Heeley is quite right that protecting children and mothers from violence can be achieved through the courts and a whole bunch of other forms of protection. As the Minister said, it should not be the function of the birth registration system to start arguing about whether there are child protection or domestic violence issuesit is simply about who the parents of a particular child are. If the mother has a duty to notify the registrar of information about the father so that information can be recorded and, hopefully, verified at some point in the future, the number of exemptions that relieve the mother of that duty should be very small, or there should be none at all. The mother should have to provide the informationthe only exemption that makes any sense at all is where she does not know who the father is, because clearly she would not be able to communicate any information. I thus do not follow the logic of the Ministers arguments about amendment 36.
On amendment 37, we have had a good debate about threats of domestic violencethey are clearly very important and, fortunately, real in only a relatively small number of cases. The right way to deal with them is to look at other processes, whether that is the criminal justice system or the system of injunctions. When discussing violence, the Minister did not address how we should deal with that within the child maintenance system. The issues that she talked about are related to whether the Child Maintenance and Enforcement Commission is told who the father is, and that then intervenes, which may then lead to a whole bunch of other issues. Until relatively recently, a mother was compelled to involve the Child Support Agency, or its successor, if she was on benefits, whether she wanted to or not. That might have led to all these complicated issues. The Minister would have been better to keep these provisions short, sweet and crisp, and focused on the notification of birth registrations, without over-complicating things. However, given that we have had a good debate, I will not press my amendments to a Division, although we may well return to the issue on Report.
I want to close by commenting briefly on the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Rochdale. I take his point about circumstances in which the father already had parental responsibility, but his amendments are concerned with situations in which the mother might
fear for her safety...if the father were to acquire responsibility
by virtue of the relevant provisions of the Children Act 1989. The father in that situation does not have responsibility from that source already; it is something that he must go to court to get. There is already a procedure to cover such circumstances.

Paul Rowen: As the Minister said earlier, a change is being made to the law, and once the registration takes place the father will not have to go to court to get parental responsibility. That is the issue that I am concerned about.

Mark Harper: No, the problem is the way in which the hon. Gentleman has drafted his amendments, which specify only certain circumstances in which the father might acquire responsibility by virtue of the 1989 Act. If the father already had parental responsibility, the situation would not be a valid reason for the mother not to make the declaration in the first place. The hon. Gentlemans intentions might be appropriate, and the Minister might have confirmed that his concerns are valid, but the amendments are not well drafted and do not achieve the objective he intends them to. They are not very sound. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Mark Harper: I beg to move amendment 38, in schedule 6, page 94, line 19, leave out subsection (3).
The amendment relates to the provisions on scientific tests to determine paternity, which make it clear that those tests would happen with the consent of both parties. My amendment would omit the measure that specifies that the regulations may not require people to participate in the tests and makes it clear that they are voluntary. My reason for probing the Minister on this is two-fold. First, if the tests are purely voluntary, I am not quite sure what proposed new section 2E of the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953 Act adds to anything. It seems to me that without the provision it would be perfectly possible, when there was doubt about paternity, for the mother and father to get a test and establish that the father was indeed the father of the child. The mother could notify the registrar and the father could confirm the information. It would seem that that could all be done perfectly well without the provision, so if the Minister can explain why it is in the Bill, that would be helpful.
Secondly, I want to probe a little about the reason for not including the possibility of compulsion. I am not sure that I am in favour of it, but I want to find out why the Government, having drafted the new provisions, which are quite long and complicated, felt that compulsion was not required. That brings me back to the question of the importance for the child of knowing who its parents are. Why does the Minister not think it appropriate that, in a situation in which the mother says one man is the father and he says he is not, it should be possible to order a test to clear the matter up? There are circumstances when that happens, such as court cases involving assets, money, wills and legacies. The courts can order tests to determine paternity, so it seems that it would be perfectly possible to do so in the matter of registering a birth so that the child could know who its parents were. That principle is accepted in a range of other contexts, and I wondered if the Minister could outline why the Government did not think it appropriate for the purposes of birth registration.

Kitty Ussher: I am happy to provide the explanation that the hon. Gentleman wants. The principle is that when there is a dispute, it is dealt with through the courts, and that when we can make things easier in a co-operative environment, we can do so through the registry office. We do not want to make adversarial a process that is designed to assist parents and facilitate birth registration. We will provide parents with information about tests and we can explain the advantages of co-operating but, on reflection, we do not think it right for the registry office to insist on tests if parents or putative parents have a bitter dispute about parentage. As the hon. Gentleman rightly says, there are many contexts in which that might happen.
If the situation is adversarial, there are court provisions to resolve itthat is the best way to do that. When the situation is not adversarial, it is right that the registry office is able to offer advice and facilitate the taking of a paternity test to make it easier for the parents to resolve the matter. In a voluntary situation, the measure is a simplification that makes it easier for parents to resolve the issue. If the situation is adversarial, we take it out of the registry office and leave it where such situations are always resolved: in the courts.

Mark Harper: I am grateful to the Minister for that explanation. It is still not entirely clear if the proposed new subsection enables the registry to do anything that it could not do already. There seems to be nothing preventing the publication of literature to explain how paternity tests work and how one might go about getting one. The Minister does not seem to have set out what this chunk of the Bill achieves or what it changes about the registration process. It might just be me, but I do not think that she made that clearperhaps she will have another go.

Kitty Ussher: I am happy to have another go. This is simply about having a process that is recognised by the registry office, which is why it needs to be in legislation. At the moment, the registry office has to go through a court for the registrar to be able to accept paternity. This measure enables a civil process that would make it far easier to resolve the matter in a non-adversarial situation. We need to have that in law so that the registrar can accept the results without having to go to a court. It is a simplification measure, and the hon. Gentlemans party has always said that it is in favour of simplification.

Mark Harper: The situation is still not clear. If the mother and the father agree, having had the test, that they are the mother and the fatherthis is a voluntary situationI am not sure what the registrar has to accept. It is not the result of the test, because if the result was disputed, there would be an adversarial court process, as the Minister said. If the situation is amicable, the test is purely factualit says who the father isand parentage is agreed, so both parents can say that to the registrar and the process can continue. The measure does not add much except more words to the Bill; it does not give the registrar any particular powers.

Kitty Ussher: Okay, I will give the hon. Gentleman one example, although I do not want to get into specifics: a man says, That child is mine but mum says, Actually, Ive had a few partners and am not quite sure. Do we have to go to court to sort that out, or can the registrar recognise parentage?

Mark Harper: This is still not clear. That case does not seem to bring us further forward, but I will not detain the Committee. In that case, once the mother and father were clear about the result of the test, they could say that to the registrar. However, we have talked considerably about the issue, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: 114, in schedule 6, page 98, line 40, leave out from child to end of line 41 and insert
( ) where the alleged father acknowledges that he is the father of the child, require the alleged father to give prescribed information to the registrar, and
( ) where the alleged father gives that information to the registrar,.(Kitty Ussher.)

This amendment relates to the process for re-registering a birth to include the fathers details. Where a man acknowledges to the registrar that he is the childs father, it ensures that he can be required to provide the registrar with the information needed to re-register the birth.

Schedule 6, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 45

Consequential amendments of subordinate legislation

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Mark Harper: I want to make just one brief comment on clause 45[Interruption.] I hope that the Minister for Employment and Welfare Reform will stop groaning.
The first part of the clause concerns consequential amendments to subordinate legislation. Subsection (1) says:
The Secretary of State may by regulations made by statutory instrument make such provision amending or revoking any instrument made under any other Act before the passing of this Act as appears to the Secretary of State to be appropriate in consequence of any provision of this Act, other than a provision contained in Part 2.
I want to probe why it is felt appropriate to have powers to make consequential amendments to subordinate legislation for parts 1, 3 and 4 of the Bill, but not part 2. We had a good debate on the right to control in part 2, and I can see no good reason why it was excluded. Perhaps the Minister can explain that to the Committee.

Tony McNulty: Separate provision is made for the right to control under clause 36.

Mark Harper: That is a good explanationand a quick one. On that basis, I am content.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 45 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 46 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 7 agreed to.

Clauses 47 to 50 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause 1

Ambit of appeals under section 20 of the 1991 Act
(1) Section 20 of the Child Support Act 1991 (c. 48) (appeals to appeal tribunals) is amended as follows.
(2) Subsection 7(b) (appeal tribunals not to take into account any circumstances not obtaining at the time when the Secretary of State made the decision or imposed the requirement) is omitted..(Mr. Harper.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mark Harper: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The purpose of the new clause, which we have discussed with Gingerbread, would enable child support appeal tribunals, when considering child support appeals, to consider all matters up to the date of the hearing. The present position under section 20(7)(b) is that a tribunal is not allowed to take into account any circumstances that did not exist at the time when the decision under appeal was made. That rule effectively came through from social security legislation.
The reason why child maintenance appeals are problematic is partly that it takes so long for cases to be determined by a tribunal after an appeal. The information supplied to me by Gingerbreadit was obtained from the Department for Work and Pensions; the Minister may or may not be able to confirm its accuracysuggests that it takes about 33 weeks. On average, 11 weeks elapse between the submission of an appeal to the Child Support Agency and the passing of the papers to the Tribunals Service. Once the papers are received by the Tribunals Service, on average just under 22 weeks elapses. The problem, which can affect both the parent with care and the non-resident parent, is that circumstances often change before the appeal is heard.
To provide a specific example, after the decision has been made someones income or job circumstances could change and the appeal tribunal would then be making a decision based on a set of facts that no longer exists. That can take place over 33 weeks, which is the best part of a year. In respect of child maintenance it would be much better if the appeal tribunal could look at the present position and reach a decision about the level of child maintenance with some finality.
This is a relatively simple point and it is worth testing the Minister on whether the Government think that it has any merit in child maintenance cases. I am not suggesting that we adopt the process for social security benefit caseseffectively, that is where the idea stems frombut we should certainly do so for child maintenance cases. With the delay in the system, it makes sense for the appeal tribunal to be able to take into account all the relevant information up to the date of the appeal, so that it can make a better decision that is more likely to be final; otherwise, the process may need to be repeated because the information has changed. That streamlining measure would help both the parent with care and the non-resident parent get to some form of closure. Will the Minister think about this matter?

Paul Rowen: I understand why the hon. Gentleman tabled the amendment. He has done so because of the long time it takes to hear appeals. However, in seeking to deal with one problem he would be creating another.
The solution to the problem is to ensure that CMEC, the new body, deals with such matters a lot quicker than the Child Support Agency currently does. The information that a court or an appeal tribunal has to deal with cannot be constantly changing. There must be a fixed reference point at which all information is put before a tribunal, at which point that becomes the information that the tribunal is dealing with. I suggest to the hon. Gentleman and the Minister that the solution to the problemand there is a problemis not to allow late information, but to tackle the time it takes to consider appeals through the tribunal.

Kitty Ussher: For the first time I agree with what the hon. Member for Rochdale has said. It is nice, as we enter the final stages of consideration of the Bill, that there should be some harmony in the Committee.
If the appeal system is taking too long, that is a matter for the judicial system. I agree with the hon. Member for Forest of Dean that we need to try to sort out the length of time the process takes, although I do not recognise the figures he used. Presumably, the lower the number of errors made by CMEC, the lower the number of appeals, and therefore the less likely this situation is to occur. We can judge from the verifiable figures that the CSA is producing that the amount of maintenance that it is collecting was rising over £1 billion last year. The number of unprocessed applications has fallen dramatically to 55,000that is still too high, although it used to be 280,000so we hope that things are moving in the right direction.
There are two immediate problems with the new clause. It could cause more delays because the tribunal would have to look at more information, which fluctuated over time. Therefore, we could get into the perverse situation in which the tribunal was taking so long that there was more new information. That would be costly for the taxpayermore so than if the decision making on the award remained with the commission. If the tribunal took new information into account and made a decision, it is worrying that the non-resident parent would lose their right of appeal, whereas if the decision rests with CMEC, there is a right of appeal. Therefore it is right and proper to follow the design of the social security legislation and leave the decisions with CMEC, which can be appealed on a point of law only, to a tribunal with a snapshot of the situation at that time.
If there is new information, it is still the commissions right to withdraw the hearing so that the appeal lapses, and to simply revise the award based on that new information in parallel with an appeal process concerned with a point of law. In a sense, it becomes hypothetical whether the underlying decision has been changed. It raises an interesting question but we cannot accept the new clause.

Mark Harper: Will the Minister furnish the Committee with the information about delays that I told her about, which was supplied to Gingerbread by the Department for Work and Pensions and covered child support appeals between April and December 2008? It was 11 weeks between the appeal by the CSA and the papers going to the Tribunals Service and just under 22 weeks clearance time for an appeal by the Tribunals Service. The Minister said that she did not recognise the numbers, and I accept that they may not be accurate. Can she furnish the Committee with accurate information?

Kitty Ussher: Not off the top of my head, but I will write to the Committee before Report to clarify those data.

Mark Harper: I am grateful to the Minister for pledging to share that information. It will be helpful. The hon. Member for Rochdale, in his outbreak of harmony, was correct; it would be better if both the CSA and CMEC were swifter. [Interruption.] I thought that the Minister had finished.

Jimmy Hood: Order. Yes, she did finish and this is the response to the Minister.

Mark Harper: I thought that was what had happened. Thank you for clarifying that, Mr. Hood. The Minister was good to set things out. It would be beneficial if CMEC made more accurate decisions in the first place and fewer were appealed. If CMEC and the Tribunals Service dealt with appealed decisions more swiftly, the problems would be minimised. We do not have the power to do that by tabling new clauses, but doing so has enabled the hon. Member for Rochdale to make his points and I support him.
When the Minister supplies us with the information, it will be helpful to see what the delays are. The Ministers best argumentand why I will not press the new clause to a Divisionwas about how taking decision making away from CMEC would effectively remove the right to appeal. On reflection, I think that the Minister has made a good point. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 2

Disability living allowance: mobility component
(1) Section 73 of the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 (c. 4) (the mobility component) is amended as follows.
(2) In subsection (1), after paragraph (b) insert
(ba) he falls within subsection (2A); or.
(3) In subsection (1A)(a), after (b), insert , (ba).
(4) After subsection (2), insert
(2A) A person falls within this subsection if
(a) he is blind; and
(b) he satisfies such other conditions as may be prescribed..
(5) In subsection (5), after (2)(a), insert or subsection (2A)(a).
(6) In subsection (11)(a), after (b), insert , (ba)..(John Robertson.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

John Robertson: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
The new clause is self-explanatory and needs little introduction, but the clarity and familiarity of the issue should not obscure the justness of the case and the need to right a long-standing wrong. The new clause would amend the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 to enable a blind person to qualify for the higher rate mobility component of the disability living allowance, which that Act excludes them from unless they are also physically unable to walk. It is easy to see why that exclusion does not make sense, and more than 300 MPs have signed up to support this change. There is also overwhelming support among the general public, with more than 90 per cent. of people believing that those who are blind should be eligible for the higher rate of mobility component. The groundswell behind the new clause is down to the work of the Royal National Institute of Blind People, and I pay tribute to its campaigning on this issue and many others, and on its work across the board as a charity. I have worked on welfare reform issues for a number of years, and it has never failed to impress me.
This anomalythe way in which the DLA worksfrom the 1992 Act must surely have been a mistake and an unintended consequence that such Committees must root out. They were probably difficult times back in 1991 when the issue was first discussed, but that is no excuse for successive Governments not righting the wrong. Despite facing some of the biggest, and often most insurmountable, barriers to independent mobility, blind people were denied the higher rate of mobility support, which was limited to those who face physical barriers to getting around. That means a difference of £29 a week for a blind person on the lower rate of mobility component, or more than £1,500 a year. There is no good reason for discriminating between someone who faces physical barriers of mobility and someone who is unable to move around safely and independently owing to blindness.
The case of one of my constituents, Mr. Alan McDonald, highlights the paradox. He has been blind from birth and faces huge hurdles to getting around. He is unable to use public transport because of difficulties getting on and off buses and trains, and either he needs to spend other benefits, which are meant to provide other support, on taxis, or he is forced to rely on his sister for lifts to where he needs to go. Otherwise, he stays at home. His blindness is not his only barrier to mobility. He is currently awaiting a second kidney transplant and will, in a few months time, undergo surgery for hardening of the arteries. Despite all those difficulties, he has been told on several occasions that he simply cannot qualify for the higher rate because he is physically able to walk. The barriers that he faces are just as great as those for someone who is not able to walk, however, and it is nonsensical to pretend otherwise. Blind people like him feel justifiably angry about this discriminatory and unfair treatment by the DLA system.
Equality is not the only reason why we need to make this change, however. Without the freedom that independent movement brings, it is all too easy for blind people to become isolated and excluded from society and the leisure and activities that they value. It also affects them at the most basic level, preventing access to essential public services such as hospitals.
That exclusion is also played out in employment. Two thirds of working-age people with sight loss are not in work, and a Leonard Cheshire Disability report in 2003 found that visually impaired people are the group that is most adversely affected in that respect. Yet, that group is denied additional assistance. If we are serious about improving the employment rate for disabled people, surely we need at least to ensure they can get to an interview in the first place.
At the RNIB lobby of Parliament in October, the Minister with responsibility for disabled people spoke in very positive terms about how and when, rather than if, blind people would be given access to that component. I understand that costing and conditions for eligibility have been carried out by the Department, and I suggest that the new clause, and the Bill, offer the perfect response to both questions that the Minister raised.
I remind Members that about 26,000 people in the UK have no useful sight for orientation purposes, and I would challenge anyone to say that such people do not face some of the most significant barriers to getting around. It is time that the mobility component of DLA lived up to its name, and it is time for us to live up to blind peoples expectations.

Paul Rowen: I congratulate the hon. Member for Glasgow, North-West and the RNIB on the new clause. We can all support it, because as he says, it would right a wrong.
The key point about the proposal is that people will become eligible for, rather than have an automatic entitlement to, higher rate DLA. The discrimination at the moment is that people are ineligible for the higher rate and can qualify only for the lower rate. It should be left to the normal processes of medical assessment to decide. Why should someone who is physically handicapped be eligible for an award when someone with a sight impairment is not?
The sums of money that the DWP spends on this annually are quite small£45 million for 22,000 people. That was the figure that was given to the RNIB. It is a comparatively small amount of money in global terms, even if all 22,000 people automatically qualify. The caveat is that people will not automatically qualify. They will have to demonstrate that their disability means that they qualify. That that does not apply is the injustice that blind people feel at the moment.
I have been given an example by my hon. Friend the Member for Twickenham (Dr. Cable). A 14-year-old boy in his constituency had had an accident when he was nine and had ended up being severely disabled, with poor eyesight. He was initially given the higher rate, which meant that his mother qualified for a Motability vehicle, which she has used to take him around. He is now able to walk but his sight has not improved, and following a reassessment he now gets the lower rate. His mother will therefore lose eligibility for the Motability vehicle.
In our view, these decisions should not depend on which rate a person is on; they should be based on a proper assessment. The fact that the boy became ineligible for the higher rate caused the mother to lose eligibility. The key point is that blind people should be eligiblewe are not saying that they would all automatically qualify. A number of hon. Members back such a changeas the hon. Member for Glasgow, North-West said, more than 200 Members signed various early-day motions in the past two yearsand there is a very strong feeling across the House that this is the right time for a change. The Bill would be considerably strengthened in a number of ways if the Government accepted the new clause. I am sure that people would be very pleased if the Government accepted such a positive measure.

Mark Harper: I simply want to flesh out what the hon. Member for Glasgow, North-West said about the definitions. He referred to the phrase, no useful sight for orientation purposes, which the RNIB used. For the benefit of the Committee, in a written answer, the Under-Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, the hon. Member for Chatham and Aylesford, said that
during helpful discussions with the RNIB they have suggested that...no useful sight for orientation purposes...could be interpreted as meaning that a visually impaired person would have: no perception of light; perception of light only; perception of hand movement; or...total or extensive loss of visual field. Using these definitions of visual impairment we estimate that, if implemented in 2010-11, we would require additional annual benefit expenditure of around £45 million to extend the higher rate.[Official Report, 23 February 2009; Vol. 488, c. 57W.]
I await the Ministers response.

Jonathan R Shaw: I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, North-West on the new clause. All members of the Committee will agree that he put forward a compelling and passionate argument for such an important change. He has a track record of campaigning for blind and visually impaired people, both in his constituency and further afield.
I thank the hon. Member for Rochdale for bringing forward a case on behalf of the hon. Member for Twickenham, and the hon. Member for Forest of Dean for setting out the information that I was able to supply. His lack of comment about whether he supported the proposal was deafening. Perhaps we will hear at a later stage whether he and the Conservative party have an opinion on this.

Mark Harper: I am listening to you.

Jonathan R Shaw: And we listened to the hon. Gentlemans very succinct remarks, which offered no opinion. I invite him to intervene to give me an opinion. There we are, we have heard the opinion of the Conservative party.
Perhaps I can bring some context to this. Some 65,000 people who receive disability living allowance are recorded as having a sight impairment as their primary disability. Of those, around 58,000 receive the lower rate mobility component and around 4,600 the higher rate. The DLA is clearly working for a great number of visually impaired people. Having said that, the Government are sympathetic to the call for change, specifically regarding the rules on entitlement to the higher rate mobility allowance.
I have a personal commitment to this. One of the first things that I did on becoming Minister for disabled people was to review some of the correspondence that the Department had received. I found a letter to the Secretary of State dated 22 August last year that told my right hon. Friend that he should read the enclosed letter from Ms Karen Osborn, the chief executive of KAB Sight Centre, and that asked for comments on the issues raised in that letter. It also said that reassurances would be welcomed that the Department was determined to end the exclusion of blind people from this important extra cost benefit when they face some of the greatest barriers to independent mobility. The letter was signed Jonathan Shaw MP, the Member of Parliament for Chatham and Aylesford. That puts my activity as a constituency Member of Parliament on record. My right hon. Friend the Member for Stirling (Mrs. McGuire) subsequently wrote back because there were some discussions about costs. Hon. Members will remember that the original cost put forward by the RNIB was about £30 million per year. As we have heard, since work has been undertaken, there has been agreement that the cost would be about £45 million.
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has also confirmed his support by saying:
The Government do not have any objection to it in principle. They totally understand the case that is being made.
I am pleased to say that, in recent weeks and months, we have been able to work with the RNIB in the way mentioned by the hon. Member for Forest of Dean. I am enormously grateful for its work in engaging with us positively to find a workable solution. Although we have made huge progress in developing this measure, as my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, North-West knows, the issue is about finding funds within limited resources. Our priority at this time is to stabilise the economy and help people remain in or return to work. Any spending decisions in this context must be focused on a stable economy, businesses, supporting families and helping people to remain in or return to the labour market. Spending decisions at this time will clearly be difficult and must be taken in the context of continued pressure to deliver efficiency across the Government. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State has alluded to these pressures.

Paul Rowen: I have been listening carefully to the Minister. Given that there is a process of people migrating from incapacity benefit to employment and support allowance, and that a lot of work is going on to get people who may have been on incapacity benefit back into work, does he not accept that some savings are going to be made? They could be passported over to this particular group, thus enabling this wrong to be righted.

Jonathan R Shaw: There are always competing demands for the DWP budget and I shall set out carefully the context on which we need to focus.
My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State said on Second Reading:
If we move forward with this, we will have to find the investment not only for now, but for the medium term, because a continuing commitment would be involved.[Official Report, 27 January 2009; Vol. 487, c. 186-87.]
As has been said, we now estimate that the additional benefit expenditure would be about £45 million per year, with a £12 million administrative spend in the first year alone. However, we estimate that the ongoing costs of administrating the change would quickly fall to around £2 million per year, although we would still need to find resources to cover at least £45 million a year and rising in the years going forward. Funding on such a scale could not be found from this Bills measures. While the Government fully recognise the intentions behind the new clause, accepting it without having the funding to support it would require us to withdraw funding from elsewhere in the benefit system.
Nevertheless, as the hon. Member for Rochdale suggested in terms of incapacity benefit, hon. Members will know that we are increasing Access to Work over the next few years. That is assisting many peopleblind people, in particularby enabling them to get into work. We want to continue to work with RNIB and the partner organisations to ensure we do all that we can for blind and visually impaired people. I anticipate that some of my comments will disappoint my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, North-West and, indeed, other members of the Committee. We cannot, at this stage, provide substantive support for the new clause. However, I assure him and the Committee that we will continue to look at the matter.

John Mason: Will the Minister give us an indication of what time scales we are talking about?

Jonathan R Shaw: I am not in a position to be able to give the Committee a time scale. When we are in a position to finance a change to the rules, we are firmly committed to make that change an urgent priority and to do so at the earliest possible time. Given that assurance, I hope my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, North-West will withdraw his new clause.

John Robertson: My hon. Friend started by saying that I gave a compelling and passionate argument, although it was obviously not compelling and passionate enough. He is absolutely right that I was disappointed by what he had to say. My head says I should press the new clause to a Division because I know right is on my side. However, I am going to overrule my head in this case and think about going away to fight another day. I want to ensureand I say this to the Minister as a promise, not a threatthat such a measure goes through in this House, not the other place. I believe that if the other place considers such a measure, it will go through there. However, it is important that elected representatives make this decision. I want our House to agree to such an amendment, so with the promise that I will return to this on Report, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 6

Minimum income level for persons subject to sanctions
Regulations made by the Secretary of State shall set minimum income figures per week which no individual or family in receipt of benefits, and subject to any sanction under this Act, is permitted to fall below following the imposition of any sanctions..(John Mason.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

John Mason: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Jimmy Hood: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: new clause 7Implementation of sanctions in relation to income
External providers and jobcentres shall not apply sanctions under this Act when the job offered to a claimant provides a lower income than that provided by unemployment benefits..
New clause 8Means inquiry before sanctions imposed
(1) In any case where regulations made by the Secretary of State under this Act or other powers contain provisions for the imposition of sanctions resulting in the loss or reduction of any sum in benefit, the regulations shall contain a duty that before any sanction is imposed
(a) a means inquiry is conducted as to the means of the person on the day;
(b) regard shall be had to the welfare of any person residing with him;
(c) regard shall be had to a medical report as to his/her physical and mental well-being and any person residing with him/her;
(d) any sanction resulting in loss or reduction of benefit will be reasonable in the circumstances;
(e) regard shall be had to the impact of any deduction on the ability of the person to pay costs in respect of the accommodation which he/she may occupy.
(2) Following consideration of the matters prescribed in paragraph (1) the decision maker shall then determine whether the income remaining to the person who will be subject to the sanction falls below the minimum figure for income in one week which is set by the Secretary of State.
(3) If any sanction is imposed following the inquiries in (1) above of any sanction, the decision-maker shall ensure that no person will be left either with a total income which is either below the minimum figure for income set by the Secretary of State or in any other case is no more than two thirds of the amount in benefit payable to the person in any one week during which it is proposed that the sanction shall operate, unless the relevant amount of benefit payable in any one week is £5.00 or below.
(4) Where the means inquiry establishes that a person is already subject to deductions from benefit which but for the effect of this subsection would result in the amount of benefit available to the person in any one week falling below the amount set by the Secretary of State, the imposition of any deduction shall be suspended.
(5) Any regulations made by the Secretary of State permitting or allowing any sanction resulting in loss or reduction of benefit to any person shall be subject to a right of appeal.
(6) Any person affected by a sanction imposed may appeal to the Secretary of State for a variation of the amount, provided that no variation however occasioned shall as a result leave the person with less than the sum prescribed in regulations under paragraph 2..

John Mason: I would like to challenge the Committee with a question: what is our starting point as we look at this Bill? Is it that the state is so generously funding people who do not really deserve it that we must cap all our expenditure and, if possible, reduce it? Some might say that is the traditional view of the main Opposition party. Alternatively, are we approaching the Bill from the point of view that every adult, family and child needs to have enough to live on so that they are able to eat, have a proper home, and be properly clothed? Anything that we do under the Bill must take account of those points, and some would say that that is the traditional view of the party in government.
One of my fundamental problems with the idea of sanctions is that some people are already living on a minimal income. If we cut that income further, where will that leave those people? In particular, where will it leave families, and especially children?
The Committee has discussed loans at some length. There has been mention of social fund loans, but people take other loans as well, and they eat into their ability to pay bills. In fact, on Friday, a constituent came to me who had got seriously into debt because of his mothers funeral. He was unwise to pay as much as he did on the funeral, but[Interruption.]

Jimmy Hood: Order. There are four conversations going on in the room. I ask hon. Members to listen to the hon. Member for Glasgow, East.

John Mason: Thank you, Mr. Hood; you are very generous.
I asked the Barnardos representative in our evidence session where this would leave families and children. The answer seems to be that the extended family will help the children to eat, that the parents might be out stealing, or that people will just not be eating at all. The constituent to whom I referred told me that he had gone three days without eating in the previous week. That is the kind of world in which, I am afraid, we are still living.
I am not against sanctions per se, if people have extra income above the amount that they need to live on. However, the benefit system is not exactly generous and does not give people a lot of leeway to meet such sanctions. New clause 8 proposes a means inquiry, which would help to re-emphasise that we must know peoples real circumstancesnot theoretically or on paperwhen we are talking about moving into sanctions.
Clearly, we are living in a society with many different kinds of people. There are people who try to screw the system to get every penny they can get and who contribute absolutely nothing to society. It is those people who the Government are probably seeking to target through the Bill. I am not opposed to that, but I urge them to think of the people in society who are struggling, who are scared of this House and of bureaucracy, and who find it difficult to read and write and to take part in our incredibly complicated system. I appeal to Ministers to consider how we can better protect these people, and I would suggest that these new clauses would help to protect them.

Paul Rowen: I support the hon. Gentleman, who speaks for the Scottish National party, on these new clauses.
Throughout our proceedings, the Government have made much of international comparisons when they have talked about the success of using sanctions as a means of getting people back into work. However, there is one major difference when one looks at these international comparisons: the level of the benefits that are paid in the Netherlands or Australia, for example, compared with what is paid in the UK. That is part of the reason why many voluntary bodies and charities have expressed concerns about certain aspects of the Bill. When sanctions are applied, that should not, in itself, result in hardshipfor example, for childrenand lead to people falling further into poverty.
As the hon. Gentleman said, new clause 8 would not stop the implementation of sanctions, but would ensure that, before those sanctions were implemented, a proper means inquiry was carried out into what effect any particular sanction would have on a family. That would act as an important stop on the Department, because one of the overriding threads running through concerns raised about the Bill is the way in which sanctions will affect vulnerable people. I know that Ministers have tried to reassure us that situations will not arise that result in a vulnerable person losing benefit, either because of a mental health problem or some other issue. That is well made as a general point, but the new clauses would ensure that there was adequate protection via the means inquiry to ensure that safeguards were in place.
If the purpose of the Bill is to encourage more people back into work, it is clearly not in anyones interest if, as a result of sanction, a child is put into care because the parent is unable to cope with the situation, because the cost of that to the state would be much greater. I thus hope that the Minister will consider this important safeguard. If the wording being suggested is not correct, I hope that the Minister will agree to look at it and come back with a suitable provision on Report. We all want a Bill that works and a system of sanctions that has the desired effect, but we have severe concerns that there are no adequate safeguards in place to ensure that the effects of those sanctions do not result in a person being put in a much worse position, with consequential effects on other members of their family.

Ann McKechin: This has been an interesting debate. The hon. Members for Glasgow, East and for Rochdale have both forgotten the basic point: there is a contract between the applicant and the state and if one obeys the rules, no sanctions will be applied. It is not unreasonable for us to insist that people should obey reasonable rules that are set down, with appropriate provisions to consider peoples individual circumstances and also offer people a route out of work.

Paul Rowen: I accept the Ministers point, but does she not accept that the state often gets it wrong, and that the proposal that is put forwardwhether it be at work, or whatevercan be inappropriate for a person, which can result in hardship?

Ann McKechin: With the greatest respect, that is why we have a comprehensive appeals procedure in place. For example, only one in 10 jobseekers allowance customers has their benefits sanctioned. Only a little over 1 per cent. of lone parents received second, or subsequent, sanctions in 2006-07. I respectfully put it to both hon. Gentlemen that the sanction system works and that we have in place an adequate system of protection and appeals.
All three new clauses relate to sanctions. New clauses 6 and 8 attemptalthough clumsilyto redesign the sanction system. They would introduce a minimum level below which the income of an individual or family could not fall for them to be subject to a sanction. That minimum would apply even if they were being sanctioned for not fulfilling their obligations to engage with the support that we were offering them. It would be applied only after all outgoings were taken into account. I know that the motivation behind the measures, as both hon. Gentlemen have stated, is to ensure that vulnerable people are protected, but they are unnecessary.
Hardship provisions, minimum levels of benefit and extensive safeguards already exist in the benefit system to ensure that the most vulnerable claimants are not unfairly sanctioned or left destitute. In addition, income replacement benefits, which are the only ones subject to sanctions, make up only a proportion of the overall support that a customer would seek to receive from the Government. For example, benefits paid to parents in respect of their children and housing benefit, which is one of the most generous systems in Europe, as well as council tax benefit, tax credits and disability living allowance, are all unaffected. Vulnerable people are unlikely to lose all their income and become destitute, because their housing benefit and council tax benefit remain intact.
We accept that the sanctions system is not perfect and we are continuously reviewing current practice to see if it can be improved. That is why we are exploring an escalating sanctions model in pathfinder areas as we test the Gregg model of conditionality. We are in the early stages of designing that model. As we progress, we will engage with a range of stakeholders to ensure that the appropriate safeguards are in place to make sure that vulnerable claimants are protected and that the existing rights of appeal remain.
We must not lose sight of the fact that there is a very simple way for claimants to avoid being sanctioned in the first place: by meeting their obligations as citizens to prepare or look for work. That is the essence of an active welfare state, and such a system has been adopted by every other western economy.
The new clauses would give the very different message that benefits could be received with no conditions attached, and that even if a claimant had no intention of ever attempting to better their chances of employment, despite being clearly able to do so, taxpayers would still be supposed to pick up the bill for supporting them. That is the essence of the passive welfare state that has quite rightly been rejected.
New clause 7 is an attempt to ensure that no jobseeker will be sanctioned for refusing employment if the job on offer paid less a week than they would have got on jobseekers allowance. It would not apply to claimants of ESA or income support, because they are not required to take specific employment. Again, we believe that the new clause is unnecessary. The existing sanctions regime ensures that no one is sanctioned for refusing a job that pays less than the national minimum wage, which ensures a minimum income from employment. That is topped up by generous tax credits for those on a low income and those with children. Furthermore, we will help to ease the transition into work with the job grant for jobseekers who have been unemployed for more than six months.
The sanctions system is designed primarily to be an incentive to re-engage. It is the threat of a sanction that has the greatest effect, not the sanction itself, as is proven by the figures to which I have already referred. For that to remain true, the system must remain transparent, simple and clearly linked to the behaviour of the customer.
This new clauses would create a system that, frankly, would be so bureaucratic and resource-intensive that it would effectively cripple the sanctions system. Given that, and taking account of our current safeguards, I urge the hon. Member for Glasgow, East to withdraw the new clause.

John Mason: I must confess to disappointment at the Ministers harsh tone. If there had been a bit of sympathy, I would have been a bit more supportive. The contract is an interesting idea. If we enter employment, we clearly have a contract with employer and we have to fulfil certain conditions, but there has to be a minimum standard in a civilised society below which we do not fall. Even our prisoners are entitled to certain levels of food and benefit. Our children should also be entitled to such benefits. While I am happy to accept that the wording of the new clauses is not entirely perfect, I am not happy to withdraw new clause 6.

Question put,That the clause be read a Second time.

The Committee divided: Ayes 2, Noes 9.

Question accordingly negatived.

New Clause 9

Grandparents national insurance credit
(1) The Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 (c. 4) is amended as follows.
(2) In section 23A(3)(c) (Contributions credits for relevant parents and carers), after first in, insert unpaid care for 20 hours in that week or more of a grandchild under the age of 12 or of an ill, frail or disabled family member, friend or partner, or (d) otherwise in..(John Robertson.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

John Robertson: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
This debate might be a two-parter, because I know that the Minister for Employment and Welfare Reform will delight in giving me an answer. The aim of the new clause is to ensure that a person of working age does not face a pensions penalty in retirement because of taking on a significant caring role for a grandchild or somebody else in need. Grandparents Plus, which champions the vital role of grandparents and the wider family in childrens lives, has been working on the new clause. It provides a welcome voice to this debate because it represents a section of the population that is not always heard.
An early-day motion in favour of such a change has received cross-party support and has been signed by more than 80 Members. As a grandparent, I suppose that I should declare a prospective interest in new clause 9[Interruption.]

Jimmy Hood: Order. Hon. Members might be a little demob happy because we are coming towards the end of the sitting, but we must have order.

John Robertson: Perhaps the noise was being made by Committee members discussing their grandchildrenI am being a little disingenuous.
The new clause is important. Although I am not in the early throes of my working life, I, like many grandparents, am far from retirement age. I hope to have plenty of years in which to work and contribute to society. However, my family comes first, and many grandparents sacrifice their working lives for their grandchildren. The new clause would amend the Social Security Contributions and Benefits Act 1992 to create a credit for those of working age who provide 20 hours or more per week of unpaid care for a grandchild under the age of 12 or for an
ill, frail or disabled family member, friend or partner.
In the Pensions Act 2007, the Government introduced a weekly credit for parents, foster parents and carers to be specified by regulation that would go towards their pension to make up for the contributions that they would be making through national insurance. That measure did not include grandparents. When that issue was debated in the other place, Ministers promised to look into it further. I understand that the relevant regulations will be laid before Parliament in the coming weeks. I urge Ministers to use the new clause or the regulations to ensure that someone caring for a grandchild or a person in need to whom they are close will be entitled to the weekly credit.
I am sure that all hon. Members agree that anybody of working age who cares for a young grandchild, family member, friend or partner who is ill, frail or disabled for more than 20 hours a week is sacrificing time in which they could be working or engaging by doing something that is as socially beneficial as being in employment and making national insurance contributions. That is surely recognised by the 2007 Act through the introduction of the credit for parents, foster parents and other carers.
There is an obvious question of fairness and equality. When a personwhether they are a parent or a grandparentis caring for a child in the family instead of working, why should there be discrimination on their state pension? How can we say that someone caring for a family member, partner or friend is less deserving of a full state pension than someone who has spent time caring for their child?
The new clause is emphatically not about paying someone for care. There is no gain for somebody who is receiving a full state pension. It would give parity for state pension contributions. I wish to consider the specific case of grandparents who are close to retirement age, for whom the issue is more pressing. The current situation means that if a mother stays at home to care for her child, she gets a weekly credit towards her pension.

The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put (Standing Order No. 88).

Adjourned till this day at Four oclock.